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*
 
PETER MASCINI
 
Man-made disasters usually lead to the tightening of safety regulations, because
rule breaking is seen as a major cause of them. This reaction is based on the
assumptions that the safety rules are good and that the rule-breakers are wrong.
The reasons the personnel of a coke factory gave for breaking rules raise doubt
about the tenability of these assumptions. It is unlikely that this result would
have been achieved on the basis of a disaster evaluation, or high-reliability theory.
In both approaches, knowledge of the consequences of human conduct hinders an
unprejudiced judgement about where the blame for rule breaking lies.
 
I. INTRODUCTION
 
Immediately after a man-made disaster has taken place, journalists, politicians,
policymakers, and scientists ask how it could have happened, and how
similar failures can be avoided in the future. Very often part of the answer
to the first question is that the breaking of safety rules contributed to the
accident. The radiation accident that took place in a nuclear plant in the
Japanese village Tokai in 1999, resulting in forty-nine casualties, provides
an example of this reaction. It was concluded that this accident would not
have happened if the employees had followed the official rule to transport
uranium through pipes, instead of pouring it into a petrol tank with a
bucket (Van der Lugt 1999). Another example concerns the disaster that
took place in 2000 in a fireworks warehouse in the Dutch city of Enschede.
This disaster resulted in the deaths of twenty-two people. In this case, the
use of illegal storage containers and trade in illegal fireworks were identified
as the main causes of this explosion (Oosting 2001).
If the answer to the first question is that the breaking of rules contributed
to an accident, the almost automatic answer to the second question is that
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inspections regarding compliance with the rules must be intensified, and
that sanctions for breaking them must be increased. Such measures are
often proposed by the most powerful political leaders following a disaster.
President Bill Clinton did precisely that after the disaster with TWA’s Boeing
747 in 1996 (Eijsvogel 1996), and Prime Minister John Major also did it in
1997, when it became known that the Ministry of Agriculture had repeatedly
ignored emergency signals of abuses in British abbatoirs (Wittenberg 1997).
In The Netherlands the chairman of the Oosting Committee even advocated
a “cultural revolution” within the entire public administration, after the afore-
mentioned explosion in the Enschede fireworks warehouse, and a fire in a
bar in Volendam on New Years Eve 2001 that killed thirteen teenagers and
wounded around two hundred and fifty more. After both disasters, each evalu-
ation committee concluded that the administration had systematically turned
a blind eye to rule violations (Alders 2001; Oosting 2001).
On the one hand, the more or less automatic reflex to tighten the enforce-
ment of the rules is understandable. It gives a clear signal to the victims and
citizens that disasters are taken seriously and that authorities act strongly in
response to them. In this way, the authorities responsible try to restore the
loss of faith among the population. As such, this measure has an important
symbolic meaning. On the other hand, this measure also raises an important
question. Namely, it presupposes that the individuals involved with these
rule violations should have known that sooner or later, there would be an
accident, and that they ought to have taken this knowledge into account. In
other words: the safety rules were good and could be complied with, and
the violators of the rules were wrong. This article deals with the question of
whether this accusation is always justified. One can doubt this because it is
often the people who are supposed to be protected by the rules who break
those rules. So, in other words, it is assumed that the people involved in the
incident are either always free to comply with the rules, or take a calculated
risk when breaking them. Our aim is to find out whether this assumption is
correct.
This aim has both moral and instrumental implications. If rule violations
cannot automatically be labeled as human errors, it raises the question of
whether the rule-breakers can be blamed automatically, and whether increased
enforcement of safety rules is always an effective measure for the prevention
of man-made disasters.
The answer to the research question is based primarily on a qualitative
case study of a Dutch coke factory. This factory is a business unit of a multi-
national. Operators work with inflammable, explosive, and harmful chemicals,
and with powerful machinery. They do heavy and dirty work under un-
pleasant weather conditions. During the last two decades of the last century,
there have been hundreds of incidents at the factory, varying in severity from
a bruised ankle caused by stepping on a piece of coke to two casualties as
a result of falls from great height. Other serious wounds resulted, for example,
from a short circuit in an electricity closet, an exploding starting motor, and
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a fall into a tank filled with caustic soda. There have also been several very
dangerous situations that could easily have caused serious accidents. For
example, a large part of the gas-cleaning section burned down, and a huge
ventilator flew over a dune top after it broke off. These events demonstrate
that the wrong decisions in the coke factory can have very serious consequences
for the workforce and their surroundings. Nevertheless, rules were broken
regularly. The reasons given by the operators for deviating from safety rules
were analyzed, in order to determine whether these acts could be labeled as
human errors automatically. The case study is complemented by additional
data, which illustrate that the findings are not unique to the coke factory.
 
II. RISKS AND FACTS
 
I will evaluate rule violations in terms of the reasons given by employees for
breaking those rules, and not, as is usually the case with respect to man-
made disasters, in terms of the effects of rule breaking. This is a deliberate
choice. Rule breaking is automatically condemned in disaster evaluations
simply because they have led to an accident. The fact that an accident has
taken place is asserted as the undeniable proof that the violation was a
human error. This argument may seem conclusive, but in fact, is not. The
fundamental problem connected with the judgment of human conduct follow-
ing disasters was put forward by Turner in 1976. He criticized the official
evaluation reports of three industrial disasters, on which his own analysis
is based. In his opinion, these three reports are problematic because they
do not take into account the fact that the situation before the disaster
was significantly less clear for the people involved than was concluded
afterwards:
 
Each [report] dealt with the problem that caused the disaster as it was later
revealed and not as it presented itself to those involved beforehand. The
recommendations, therefore, treat the well-structured problem defined and
revealed by the disaster, rather than the pre-existing, ill-structured problems.
(Turner 1976: 393)
 
In his article (Tumer 1976), describes a model consisting of different phases
in relation to 
 
the failure of foresight
 
, which he developed more thoroughly
in his monograph 
 
Man-made Disasters
 
 (Turner 1978). In the first phase of
his model, “the way the world is thought to operate” synchronizes with
“some true state of affairs.” During the second phase, the “incubation
phase,” perception increasingly deviates from reality. This eventually results
in a disaster. Finally, this disaster results in a situation in which people
obtain an accurate perception of reality again. According to Gephart
(1984), the risk of overestimating human errors is also inherent to this model.
That is, it is only possible to decide which risks were overlooked or denied
 
afterwards
 
. According to Gephart, the people involved are confronted with
hard-to-interpret, often contradictory messages and interests, in such a way
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that their perception of reality can only be labeled as wrong on the basis of
after-the-fact knowledge:
 
Communication problems and unheeded warnings conceived by Turner as
central to the pre-onset stages are actually only seen in retrospect (Perrow
1981). They are present in all disasters and in a variety of non-disasters as well.
Considerable noise blends with potential warning signals to mask the warnings;
they are distinguishable from normal signals and false warnings only after the
fact. (Gephart 1984: 211)
 
The only, and justified, reply that Pidgeon and Turner (1997: 175) give to
this criticism, in the revised and enlarged second edition of Turner’s 
 
Man-
Made Disasters
 
, is that it is not relevant for the phase model exclusively,
but more generally to all 
 
post hoc
 
 case studies of man-made disasters.
 
1
 
Vaughan (1996) has convincingly demonstrated that the overestimation
of human errors as a result of the reconstruction of disasters is not just a
theoretical problem, on the basis of research into the cause of the explosion
of the space shuttle 
 
Challenger
 
 in 1986. The television images of this dis-
aster, leading to the death of all seven crew members—including primary
school teacher Christa McAucliffe, who was to promote this journey by
teaching about it—are undoubtedly still remembered vividly by many.
Vaughan demonstrates that the dominant explanation for this disaster was
completely wrong. The dominant interpretation was that the 
 
Challenger
 
exploded because of individual errors and managers violating crucial safety
rules in their quest for profit. She concludes that it was conformity to the
dominant culture rather than deviation from it that led to the disaster. One
of the most important causes of the accident was that the importance of
scientific proof was stuck to for too long. Consequently, the vague suggestion
that low temperatures were causing problems with the O-rings of the rocket
boosters were not taken seriously. In fact, this proved to be the direct cause
of the disaster.
Vaughan could only draw this conclusion because she tried “to forget”
that the disaster took place. She did this by limiting her analyses mainly to
documents concerning decisions made 
 
before
 
 the disaster. This method made
it possible for her to imagine how the people involved had defined the situation
at that time. According to Vaughan, their definition of the situation shows
clearly that the accusations that followed the disaster are totally unjustified.
This is the reason that she cites Starbuck and Milliken with approval, con-
cluding that “retrospective analysis of bad organizational outcomes tends
to focus attention selectively on the road not taken that might have altered
the outcome” (Vaughan 1996: 253). One inherent problem with evaluation
research into man-made disasters is thus that the people involved are
judged on the basis of the knowledge that their conduct has had serious con-
sequences, while by definition, they could not be certain about this themselves.
This is why, in this kind of research, there is always a danger that the possibilities
for the people involved to prevent the accident—for example, by complying with
the safety rules—are overestimated.
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Is it easier to evaluate human conduct objectively by analyzing socio-technical
systems that did 
 
not
 
 cause any disaster, as is done by researchers working on
the so-called high-reliability theory? (see, for example, La Porte 1994; La Porte
& Rochlin 1994; Roberts 1990, 1993; Roberts, Rousseau & La Porte 1994;
Schulman 1993: Weick 1987; Weick & Roberts 1993; Weick, Sutcliffe &
Obstfeld 1999). The answer is no. Before substantiating this answer, I will
summarize the content of the high-reliability theory. This theory is supposed
to explain why socio-technical systems, mostly American aircraft carriers, have
remained accident free. The explanation is short: because they carry out an
effective policy to prevent these accidents. Sagan (1993: 17) sums up the
four policy characteristics that would determine the accident-free status of
highly reliable socio-technical systems: (i) ability to learn from mistakes, (ii)
presence of political leaders and managers giving the highest priority to the
safety and reliability of installations, (iii) high levels of availability—back-ups—
of personnel and technical safety devices, and (iv) a “high reliability culture,”
consisting of decentralized and consistently executed procedures.
It is not a coincidence that the explanation for the absence of accidents
given by high-reliability theory only refers to policy. This theory seems to
presuppose that the fact that accidents have not taken place proves that
human conduct has been effective. However, this presupposition lacks empir-
ical foundation. The reason for this is that high-reliability theory is limited
to socio-technical systems that have remained accident-free so far:
 
If we only examine systems without failures, as the “High-Reliability Theory”
are prone to do, we are “selecting on the dependent variable”, that is, examin-
ing favorable outcomes only and then predicting what brought them about.
(Perrow 1994: 214)
 
There is no systematic comparison of the accident rates of organizations
that do and do not satisfy the four policy characteristics. The first con-
sequence of this is that other causes of the accident-free status of the systems
under scrutiny, which are not the result of human conduct—for example,
coincidence—are, incorrectly, not taken into consideration. It has been
demonstrated, for example, that nuclear military complexes have never
caused a major accident, although they do not have all the characteristics of
reliable organizations (Bourrier 1996: 105; Sagan 1993). The possibility that
these systems have remained accident free, 
 
in spite of
 
 the actual policy, is
overlooked altogether (cf. Weick 1997: 399). However, this cannot be ruled
out beforehand. Perrow (1984), Wildavsky (1988) and Sagan (1998), for
example, argue that redundancy is a source of risk rather than a source of
success. Weick (1998: 73) and Pidgeon (1998: 100) do the same with a
homogeneous (safety) culture because it excludes deviant views. So, while
accident research has a tendency to judge human conduct too severely,
high-reliability theory tends to be too positive about it.
This means that the chance of an incorrect evaluation of human conduct
is inextricably bound up with both accident research and high-reliability
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theory. The knowledge that an accident has taken place pushes researchers
in the direction of the verdict that the people involved should have anti-
cipated the disastrous consequences of their behavior. The knowledge that a
certain branch of industry has remained accident-free can easily lead to
human errors being overlooked. Researchers of man-made disasters tend to
overestimate human errors, while researchers who make use of high-reliability
theory run the risk of underestimating them. The problematic similarity
of both types of research is that explanations are sought for events that
have already happened. In the former case, they look for causes of accidents,
and in the latter for why there has been an absence of accidents. This is why
I evaluate rule violations according to the risks that accompany them, instead
of their actual consequences. The people involved act in uncertainty about
the consequences of their conduct and ought to be judged accordingly. This
means that my analysis concentrates on the chance of an accident, and not,
as in the other two research approaches, on the certainty of an accident or the
absence of it. The point of departure of this analysis is that employees who
deliberately take risks, even though they are not hampered from not doing
so, are blameworthy. One cannot automatically speak of a human error if
either one or both conditions are not met.
 
III. COLLECTION OF THE DATA AND DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE
 
The coke factory is located with ten other factories on industrial land in the
Netherlands. The central Health and Safety department helped me to gain
admittance to this factory. A member of this department asked which of
the five factories in the “steel section” wanted to participate in my research.
The main reason given by the management of the coke factory for volunteer-
ing was that they wanted to know more about the causes of accidents. The
accident ratio of this factory had remained above average, despite heavy
investments in health and safety. Management wanted to know why.
I collected the data for my Ph.D. project on the handling of health
risks (1999) on two occasions, 1995 and 1998. During the first period of
data collection, I accompanied different work shifts during their operations
and attended their meetings for one month. During conversations, I asked
employees which risks they were exposed to, what they themselves or the
organization did to control these risks, and what else should be done to
improve risk management. I also asked about the making and applying of
risk management instruments such as inspections, regulations, and accident
reports. This helped me to find out how these instruments worked out in
practice.
In the second round of data collection, I surveyed a cross-section of personnel.
One hundred and four employees gave written responses to a questionnaire,
and 69 were interviewed. All operational personnel and managers occupied
in the production and maintenance department were asked to take part in
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the survey. The response rate was 72 percent. The majority of the non-
responses consisted of employees who were not able to respond because of
illness, absence, or insufficient mastery of the Dutch language. The questions
in the survey concerned the priority given to health and safety, and the
intensity and the style of influencing others or being influenced by others,
with regard to risk management. In all interviews, respondents were asked
to give specific examples of influence attempts. Many of these examples
related to the handling of safety rules. The interview fragments given below
were translated from Dutch into English.
At the time of data collection, a permanent staff of about 270 worked in
the factory, divided between the production, maintenance, and technology
departments. I labeled the management and the shift supervisors of the coke
factory as middle management because they were subordinated to the board
of directors of the overall concern. Middle management was responsible for the
implementation of company policy and for daily management. Although
middle management predominantly enforced safety regulations, it occasion-
ally had to comply with the rules as well. They had to comply with general
safety rules when they physically went into the factory, and with more
specific rules when they were involved in operational tasks. Operational
personnel also shared responsibility for enforcing health and safety rules. It
was their formal duty to report dangerous situations, such as the violation
of health and safety rules by colleagues and superiors. However, most of the
time, operational personnel just had to comply with the rules. This means
that both middle management and operational personnel were responsible for
enforcement as well as for compliance, although the priority for enforcement
lay with middle management, and for compliance with operational personnel.
 
IV. RESULTS: THREE TYPES OF RULE VIOLATIONS
 
The bulk of the numerous safety rules of the factory are complied with
without hesitation. This is done with considerable effort and expenditure,
including the purchase and use of personnel protection devices, the registra-
tion of permits to work inside the factory, working according to regular
procedures, reporting operations, and conducting health and safety audits.
The employees not only usually comply with the rules because they think of
them as useful, but also because they give a very high priority to healthy
and safe production. In the survey, staff were asked how important healthy
and safe production is in relation to seven other goals. The average score
was 4.6 on a scale ranging from 1 (least important goal) to 5 (most import-
ant goal).
 
2
 
 Their reasons for attaching so much importance to this goal
are; the ample availability of scientific knowledge about industrial risks, the
low tolerance for these risks in society, and the tight laws to qualify for
social benefits for illness or disability. However, employees regularly break
rules. What is the reason for this, and to what extent can these acts be
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labeled as human error? I have found three kinds of reasons for breaking
the rules, that differ in the extent to which they are blameworthy.
 
A. TOO MUCH EFFORT OR TOO MUCH TROUBLE
 
The first reason for breaking rules is taking a deliberate risk because complying
requires too much trouble or effort. Hutter (2001: 241) also found that “‘taking
the easiest and most convenient’ option” is a common explanation given by the
workforce of British Rail for non-compliance. One example from the coke
factory that illustrates this kind of violation concerns a mechanic repairman:
 
Respondent:
 
Whenever I think, “Oh dear, and now I might have to do overtime”,
then I think, “Screw it”. . . . Then I do it secretly you see. . . . Then
I think, “They don’t see it anyhow’.”. . .
 
Interviewer:
 
Can you give an example of this?
 
Respondent: . . . 
 
Well, in the hall with the gas pipes. We were working on oven
twenty-one. At a certain moment we had to remove a closing valve.
So I had a working permit with me and fire hoses and two fire
extinguishers. You see, we thought we were ready and we went on
with oven twenty-three. We dropped the fire stuff, fire extinguishers
and all, but then we had to get back to oven twenty-one. We still
had to grind two bolts. I say to my buddy, “I am not going to drag
all this shit back, so leave it here.” So then I went back just like
that. I thought, “Nobody will come anyhow”. I say to my buddy,
“You go and watch out, and I will grind in a hurry.” Well, that’s
what I call quick and secretly. That’s what I said just before, you
know. You do it because of the danger of fire, gas danger.
 
Interviewer:
 
I see. You ground when the fire stuff was not there?
 
Respondent:
 
Right. We had been busy there just before.
 
Interviewer:
 
And then you had forgotten those two bolts?
 
Respondent:
 
Right, and then we thought, “Shit, quickly those other two bolts.”
Before you realize it, you are busy for yet another half an hour.
You have to empty the hose, you have to wind it up totally, you
have to bring it there, you have to go back and forth three times.
Then you think, “Let’s do it quickly,” and that’s what I call
secretly, you know, because if someone sees it, you’re in trouble.
 
 
(Mechanic repairman)
 
It is easy for an outsider to underestimate the nuisance certain safety
devices can cause in practice. For example: protective fire clothes can cause
overheating during operations at the top of ovens that are already hot, the
use of safety spectacles is a nuisance for some people who normally do not
wear spectacles, stiff pigskin gloves cause blisters during cleaning operations,
and lack of ventilation in so-called airstream helmets gives certain people a
headache. In addition, it is also not easy for an outsider to realize how much
effort it takes to comply with every safety rule consistently. Staff have to walk
long distances repeatedly to get forms signed, order a tower wagon at the right
time to be able to work safely at great height, wait for the approval of an
inspector before climbing scaffoldings, and so on. From this point of view,
it is understandable that personnel sometimes take a risk to avoid the nuisance
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or the effort that goes with systematic compliance with all the rules. However,
although this type of violation is understandable, it does not exonerate those
who break rules; on the contrary. They take a risk deliberately, even though
there is nothing forcing them to take the risk. If these violations result in an
accident, the people who violated the rules can be blamed for it.
 
B. DILEMMAS
 
It is less easy to condemn the second type of rule breaking. This is when
people know that it increases the chance on an accident, but are obstructed
from complying. In these cases, one is forced to choose between two evils.
Why so? Formally, production should not undermine safety in the coke
factory. This rule is more than just words. Management definitely makes an
effort to put this rule into practice. However, it is the case that superiors
tell their subordinates to make exceptions to the rules if the continuation of
the production process is in danger. A mechanical inspector gave an example
of this type of violation. He says that he has to comply with all regulations
during planned, weekday activities, while he was told to deviate when an
urgent problem occurred:
 
Respondent:
 
Look: as soon as you see the production process is troubled, then
all of a sudden a lot of things can be done without consideration of
the safety rules. When we weld in the gas cleaning side, we have to
have a working permit, need to have fire extinguishers present, and
have to take a carbon monoxide sample. Once something went
wrong and then only a sample was taken. We didn’t have a working
permit, and we could get going just the same. Then I think to
myself: “Well, why could it go so fast that time,” because then you
can get started within ten minutes, “and why, on a weekday, does
all of this have to happen with forms and stuff ?” There are boys
who really carry such a big pile of paper every week. Then I think
to myself: “Well, guys, it’s a nice system, but it just doesn’t work.”
 
Interviewer:
 
And what was your reaction at that time?
 
Respondent:
 
At that moment, you just get started, of course. Look, and when
you bring it up, then it’s sort of laughed about. And that’s logical,
because you’re attacking people
 
 [supervisors] 
 
on things. They, of
course, try to make a joke of it, but still it’s not the way, of course.
And I repeat: then it is possible, but if you come normally during
the week, then it isn’t possible.
 
(Mechanical inspector)
 
Operational personnel usually do what they are told, even though this
means that they have to break the safety rules. Some of them do so because
they agree that complying with all the rules is not as important as meeting
the production targets. Others do so under pressure from their superiors.
The reason for this is that superiors rarely accept the refusal of a subordinate
to execute an illegal assignment; they would carry it out themselves or give
it to another subordinate instead. In the first case, it happens that superiors
put pressure on the refusing person not to make it publicly known. From
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the point of view of their stronger hierarchical position, this is a kind of
 
blackmail
 
. An operator gives an example of this kind of pressure:
 
Respondent:
 
I’ve seen it happen that slopes were piled up with cokes due to
production difficulties. A fire developed on top of the slopes which
I had to put out. I couldn’t reach it because the jet only goes so far.
So I’m standing outside the fence putting out the fire and soon
someone from middle management approaches, takes the water
pipe away from me, climbs on top of the fence, and stands like this
to reach only one meter further. Then I said: “Well, that’s really
safe” and he says: “You’ve seen nothing, or else you have to put it
out yourself.” Then I said: “I saw nothing if that’s what you want.”
I could have argued with him then, but that wouldn’t have done any
good. . . . And because he’s a boss, it gets a bit difficult. They say
they don’t let that influence them, but, . . .
 
Interviewer:
 
You noticed that
 
 [the manager abused his position]?
Respondent:
 
Absolutely. Of course, but that’s only natural. If you have the chance
to get even with someone who has made a fool out of you, you do it.
 
(Operator)
 
Executives who give a refused assignment to another subordinate will nor-
mally opt for 
 
sarcasm
 
 instead of blackmail. In this case, blackmail to maintain
secrecy is not evident, because it is not only the person who refused who
is aware of the illegal assignment, but also the next person, who gets the assign-
ment. The first aim of emphasizing publicly that someone has exaggerated the
risks connected to the refused assignment is to legitimize their own behavior.
The second aim is to discourage people from refusing similar assignments in
the future. In the next interview extract, an operator gives an example of a
situation in which his shift supervisor made it public that he exaggerated when
he refused to descend in a scaffold tank into a large generator:
 
Interviewer:
 
You have mentioned that middle management example twice already—
that they wanted you to do certain tasks. Can you tell me what that was?
 
Respondent:
 
I’m willing to tell you about that example, but I think it has hap-
pened several times. I don’t know if you know anything about the
biological cleaner. There you’ve got the two big generators filled
with water. That’s the new bio. The water was emptied from this
tank. Then a steel scaffold pipe had to be taken out from the bot-
tom at about seven meters. A crane operator was present, but he
didn’t have a tank to lower a person in, no crane tank. Then my
shift supervisor told me: “Then we’ll take a scaffold tank that has
those scaffold pipes in them and then we’ll stand in that.” I refused
to do that and then he did it himself in that manner, even though
the crane operator also indicated he wouldn’t take that responsibility.
And that wasn’t even the worst part. Afterwards, I often enough
had to hear: “Yes, but I did get it out alright, didn’t I?” Then I think:
“Your reaction is stupid because you created an unsafe situation
and then you try to congratulate yourself afterwards.”
 
(Operator)
 
This means that employees who are ordered to violate safety rules to prevent
loss of production face an awkward dilemma. If they refuse to execute these
assignments, or if they make them public, then there is a real chance that
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their superior will punish them for it. If they carry out the assignment, then
they will probably be blamed for it if something goes wrong (cf. Fischer
1993). The trial over the death of ten mineworkers in Austria after a lime
mine collapsed is a clear example of this (Jusek 2000). The manager who
ignored safety measures for years because of profit seeking was one of the
accused. He said he acted the way he did because the owner of the mine,
Luzenac, wanted higher profits. Now the prosecutor has sued the manager
because his decisions caused a disaster. However, if he had complied strictly
with the rules, his employer would have punished him for that. This means
he was hampered from complying with the rules. Although the pressure is
less, the same holds for the employees in the coke factory who ignore safety
measures because their superiors tell them to do so.
The choice between production and safety is not the only dilemma that
confronts personnel in practice (cf. Hutter 2001: 244). De Koning and De
Vries (2001) show this in their research initiated after the fire in the Dutch
town Volendam on New Years Eve 2001. They studied the compliance with
fire regulations by the catering industry in five Dutch towns. The owner of
a bar made it clear that local authorities apply conflicting regulations: “The
fire brigade says: garbage has to be put outdoors, because inside it is a risk.
But refuse collection says: outside is not allowed, because it pollutes the
street; keep it indoors.” In this same study, an inspector noted that the door
of an establishment opens to the inside, which can cause a concentration of
people during panic situations, making it impossible to open the door.
However, a door that opens in the “escape direction” leads to the public
road, and this is not allowed. In these cases, it is impossible to make an
unproblematic choice because of contradicting rules. Rasmussen, Duncan
and Leplat (1988) have shown that the lengthy execution of repetitive labor
also unavoidably results in human errors.
This leads to the conclusion that the more someone is obstructed from comply-
ing with the rules, the more problematic it is to speak of human error. In other
words: without a clear structure supporting and encouraging moral behavior,
it is unfair to blame employees when they do not conform (cf. Bovens 1998).
 
C. “IMPOSSIBLE” RULES
 
The third reason for breaking safety rules, is with what employees call
“foolish” or “impossible” rules. These concern prescriptions thought of as
too general, far-fetched, or simply counterproductive in certain situations.
This type of violation differs fundamentally from the other two, because in
this instance, employees do not accept that violation of the rule is risky.
This is also the type of rule violation that I have most frequently encountered.
Hutter (2001: 244) also found that no less than 31 percent of the workforce
of British Rail regarded safety equipment and occupational health and
safety regulations as a hindrance instead as a help. A mechanic repairman
of the coke factory puts this argument into words as follows:
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Respondent:
 
You must finish a job within a certain amount of time all the same,
but still you have to take care that it is done safely, but this does
not mean that you have to use all safety instruments available. It
can also be done safely in other ways. . . . Many roads lead to Rome.
There are also several ways to do it safely. And if you do everything
according to the safety measures, you are busy one hour dragging
around safety devices, while the job only takes five minutes. Then
you can also do it with less, ah, . . .
 
Interviewer:
 
Could you give an example of this?
 
Respondent:
 
Suppose that you have to weld something on the side where the gas
is cleaned. First I have to pick up a fire form, then I have to get fire
extinguishers, and then I have to get gear. I am busy for about half
an hour. For a job that takes two or three minutes at the most.
Then I say, “Fetch a fire hose and it will work out just fine as well.”
 
Interviewer:
 
I see. A fire hose instead of a, . . . ?
 
Respondent:
 
Yes, because they are present at that spot already. And I think that
I am working safely as well, because if something happens, I can
extinguish it.
 
(Repairman)
 
The fact that the workers do not perceive risks when they break the rules
does, of course, not mean that there are actually no risks involved. It is well
known that employees who are exposed to risks constantly get blind to these
risks or deny them in order to reduce cognitive dissonance. An extreme
example of this concerns steel workers on skyscrapers, who totally black
out the life-threatening dangers of their work in order to control their fears
(Haas 1977). It can be argued that employees who violate rules because
they think it is not dangerous, while in fact it is, make human errors.
In order to find out whether this was the case in the coke factory, it was
important to find out what the middle management thought of the breaking
of “impossible” rules by their subordinates. Supervisors are less likely to get
blind to the risks, because they seldom carry out the tasks to which the
rules apply. So, opposition of management to the practice of their subordinates
may indicate that operational personnel do take risks when they break
“impossible” rules, although they do not perceive them.
Indeed, middle management is usually strongly opposed to this practice by
their subordinates. Management not allowing operational personnel to make
exceptions to the rules generates many differences of opinion. These differences
of opinion arise in all kinds of situations: working at great height without
a safety harness, transporting high-temperature chemical products with rubber
hoses instead of steel pipes, going in front of a large machine when you ought
to climb over it, and working in the neighborhood of a running conveyor belt.
They also take place in different phases of the work: while handing out assign-
ments, during the supervision of operations, and during meetings where the
implementation or adaptation of procedures and safety rules is on the agenda.
These differences of opinion are not restricted to the coke factory either.
It is common for so-called “street-level bureaucrats” to argue that formal rules
fit in badly with the specific circumstances to which they apply. Manage-
ment does not want employees to take these circumstances into account
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because it obstructs uniform decision-making (see, for example, Lipsky
1980). However, there are reasons why the denial of supervisors does not
automatically imply that operational personnel knowingly take risks when
breaking “impossible” rules.
First, sometimes the perception of risks is not one of the reasons why middle
managers refuse to allow their subordinates to make exceptions to the rules.
Other reasons include the fact that they do not want to generate discussions
after creating precedents, or that they want to avoid the possibility of being
held responsible for accidents resulting from rule violations that they have allowed.
Therefore, sometimes middle managers refuse to allow the breaking of “impos-
sible” rules, even though they do not perceive any risks in doing so.
Second, and more important, is that management apply double standards.
They often perceive risks when subordinates violate the rules, but not when
they themselves execute the tasks to which the rules apply. This can happen
when supervisors have to perform inspections inside the factory, or when
they have to help solving problems. Some of the managers who execute tasks
break rules themselves, while they do not allow their subordinates to do so.
A shipping supervisor illustrates this in the next extract:
 
Respondent:
 
I think I often avoid certain things because I have been around for
such a long time, and I know how it can be done safely as well. I’m
talking about the fuel system now. We
 
 [shipping department
supervisors; PM] 
 
always say to the boys: “If you go to the program,
turn off the gas pipes.” For myself, if I have to do something there,
I don’t always turn them off because I know what to do the minute
something goes wrong. If a battery just disgassed, then I know it
takes twenty minutes for it to switch to gas again. So, I have twenty
minutes to do as I please, without having to turn off the tap. And
if it switches back on suddenly, God forbid, then I know what to
do. . . . But to the boys I always say: “Always turn that thing off.”
 
Interviewer:
 
Aren’t you ever called to account for not turning the thing off your-
self and always ordering them to do it?
 
Respondent:
 
No, because whenever the two of us walk there, I let the other one do
the operations the way they have to do it.
 
Interviewer:
 
So, they can’t see it when you don’t do it yourself ?
 
Respondent:
 
No, and I myself think that there isn’t any risk in that because
I know damn well what I’m doing, and when I have to do those
operations, I think I do the rest of it according to the formal pro-
cedure. Because I don’t do it on a daily basis, I also have to think
about what I have to do.
 
(Shipping supervisor)
 
Other managers who execute tasks do comply with the rules, but 
 
not
 
because they think this is safest. They do so because they believe they have
to set an example for their subordinates. Supervisors know that it frustrates
their subordinates when they tell them to comply with “impossible” rules.
They want to preclude it from becoming harder to address subordinates
who violate rules because they themselves do not comply (cf. Hutter 2001: 250).
In the next extract, a shift supervisor expresses the wish to secure authority
by complying with rules he in fact thinks of as superfluous:
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Respondent:
 
If I miss out just a little bit once and they see it, then they really exert
pressure on me: “You weren’t doing the right thing there either. You
see, if the production gets into hot water then, . . .” As a shift supervisor,
you are treading on eggs. If there’s a malfunction somewhere or some-
where something is hanging loose. I don’t have a fear of heights, so I climb
on top of everything and everywhere. That makes no difference to me.
 
Interviewer:
 
Would you please give me an example of something that actually
happened?
 
Respondent:
 
I can do that. We had a malfunction at the coke side: a cylinder
had broken off and the wind was blowing hard. It must have been
force-seven winds, and we stood on top of that installation and then
we crawled over a fence and there we stood on top of that installa-
tion where we had to lean forward a bit. You do that without actu-
ally taking notice and then later: “You were acting stupid and
dangerous and this and that.” Afterwards I agree with them. Then
I say: “You’ve got a point there.” I won’t do it anymore. Then
you’re a production man again like: “Well, damned, that installa-
tion has stopped and we’ve got to produce again,” and as far as that
is concerned, we’ve had that
 
 Du Pont 
 
course.
 
 [The chemical
concern Du Pont sells their safety policy to other companies]
 
Then you first count to ten: “Then they’ll just have to wait a second.”
First you collect a safety belt and only then do I go there. In your
heart, you find it a bit of a comedy sometimes, but you have to set
the right example. . . . By virtue of my function, I have a role model
function, and so I will do it sooner, while thinking to myself: “I can
also do it like that,” but you don’t do that anymore then.
 
(Shift supervisor)
 
This finding shows that operational personnel are not the only ones who do
not perceive risks when they break “impossible” rules. The same holds true
for the managers who occasionally execute the tasks to which the safety
rules apply. Logically, this can mean two things.
First, they are both wrong, because the execution of tasks leads to a false
sense of security. It is well known that people who (think they) can exercise
control over their environment themselves perceive less risk than those who
cannot (Fischoff, Lichtenstein & Slovic 1981; Slovic 1987; Vlek & Keren
1992). This psychological mechanism could explain why middle managers
perceive risk when their subordinates break rules, but not when they do so
themselves. Performing operations offers the possibility of exercising control
over the working environment personally, while enforcing implies dependence
on others. It is also possible that such false sense of security occasionally
results in taking irresponsible risks when breaking rules, although this is far
from self-evident. Research has demonstrated that moderate unrealistic
optimism results in 
 
more
 
 preventive behavior, rather than less (Otten 1998).
Second, it is possible that there are no risks involved when operational
personnel break “impossible” rules, even though the enforcing supervisors
think there are. Brun (1995) has found a convincing example of this pos-
sibility in his study on the ways high-tension thread electricians work. These
electricians violated safety rules on purpose, even though they are exposed
to life-threatening risks during their work on power pylons. Management
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strongly disapproved of these violations and accused the personnel of
foolhardy and incompetent behavior. The electricians did have a good reason
for it, however. Applying all the personnel safety devices decreased the visual
contact with the working environment and hampered quick intervention in
case something went wrong. By omitting certain safety devices, they retained
visibility, and because of that, control over their own working environment.
Brun’s study shows that regulation may actually be dysfunctional.3
So, employees may occasionally deny risks when they break rules or may
have a false sense of security when they do. However, sometimes there are
simply no risks involved when they do. It is even possible that complying
with rules increases risks instead of decreasing them. This shows that for
rules are not good by definition, those who break them are not necessarily
wrong. Though this conclusion is highly relevant for the determination of
the blameworthiness of rule violations, it is definitely not new. Merton had
already warned in 1957 that too much emphasis on bureaucratic discipline
goes together with trained incapacity—the elevation of compliance with
rules into a goal in itself, with the result that the original goal of the rule
threatens to be lost out of sight. Or, as Kagan (1978; see also Knegt 1987)
put it: the letter of the law can get in the way of its spirit. So, sometimes
compliance with safety rules is risky, rather than breaking them. It is in
these instances that it is problematic to label rule violations as human error.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We have seen that in the coke factory three types of rule violations occur,
only one of which can easily be labeled as human error. This is the type in
which employees violate the rules because they think of complying as too
much trouble or tiresome. These violations are blameworthy because this
means that employees take a deliberate risk without being prevented in any
way from doing so. The second reason is when external causes make it
more difficult, if not impossible, for employees to comply with all the safety
rules. The more obstructions people meet with, the less they can be blamed
when they give in to those obstructions. The last reason for personnel to
break the rules is if they think that complying is meaningless or even counter-
productive. They cannot be blamed automatically for this type of violation
either, for the simple reason that they are sometimes correct. If they are correct,
there is even more reason to praise rule violators then to blame them. This
is particularly the case when they break rules in a context where punishing
is the standard. For this means they are prepared to control risk by breaking
rules, when they are aware that they may suffer the consequences.
Apart from these moral implications, the findings also have instrumental
value. They lead to the conclusion that the automatic response following man-
made disasters to enforce severer is not always the most effective measure
to prevent them. It is only so if rules are broken because of laziness. This
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type of violation is made less attractive by punishing rule violators. It is
true that this is also the case if violations are caused by external causes, but,
in this case, other measures are more obvious. Punishing is directed at the
violator, while the cause of the violations lays somewhere else in this case.
In these instances, better results can be expected from measures aimed at
removing the factors that are hampering compliance than from more severe
punishments for breaking the rules. If employees break the rules because
they find them “impossible,” it is surely important to be careful about tighten-
ing up enforcement. If the rules really are not any good, then this measure
increases the chance of an accident, rather than reduces it. This leads to the
conclusion that it is important to take the motives and causes of rule break-
ing into account when enforcing.
While this conclusion is at odds with the automatic reaction to disasters, it is
perfectly in line with literature on enforcement. A punishment-centered or legalistic
approach is seldom considered most effective under all circumstances (Hawkins
1990: 462; Johnstone 1999; Simpson 2002: 136, 152; Tenbrunsel & Messick 1999,
but see Pearce & Tombs 1990, 1991). Inspectors should act as “politician,”
“consultant,” or “policeman,” depending on the willingness and the capacity
of individuals or corporations to comply with rules (Kagan & Scholz 1984).
Severe sanctions should be reserved for the minority of “bad apples” that do
not share regulatory goals (Makkai & Braithwaite 1994). Inspectors also try to
put this ideal into practice. They try to match their enforcement style with their
image of their targets (Hawkins 1984; Hawkins & Hutter 1993; Mascini 1999),
though they are sometimes hampered against being coercive (Hawkins 1992;
Wilthagen 1993) or not very particular about their methods (Braithwaite
et al. 1994).
Why are the conclusions that rule violations are not always blameworthy
and that tightening up enforcement is not automatically effective not easily
drawn from disaster evaluations? The reason is that evaluators are inclined
to reason back from the consequences of the rule violations. Disasters are
easily raised as evidence that rules should be complied with. The violation
of the rule itself is not the focus of attention. Another problem with judging
rule violations which have led to a disaster is that the persons who have
committed them are almost inevitably judged more severely than those whose
violations did not cause a disaster. This is problematic because, by definition,
both categories have committed these violations in uncertainty of the con-
sequences of their acts. The unequal judgment of more or less similar acts
is less likely when they are based upon possible, instead of actual, consequences.
For such a judgment does justice to the uncertainty which is inherent to the
choice of violating rules. This indicates the surplus value of risk research in
comparison with disaster evaluations.
peter mascini is assistant professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the Erasmus
University of Rotterdam. He has published predominantly on the implementation of
policy and on enforcement.
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NOTES
1. The Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 1998, 6(2) is dedicated exclusively to
the second edition of Man-Made Disasters.
2. The average scores of the other seven goals were lower: enabling good collegial relation-
ships (3.3), providing maximum employment (3.1), producing environmentally sound (3.0),
providing optimal chances to learn and to gain experience (2.9), offering optimal promo-
tion chances (2.5), ensuring optimal incomes (2.4), and making maximum profits (2.3).
3. Two other examples of counterproductive safety rules concern the relationship between
administration and industry. The American Ministry of Transport wanted to force upon
the truck industry to introduce an “improved” brake system (Kagan & Scholz 1984: 89).
The court struck down this rule, because of clear indications that this brake system was
less dependable than the existing one and so increased the chance of truck accidents. The
ministry unjustly stuck to the introduction of this rule, because it suspected the truck
industry was opposed to this measure for purely economic reasons. In another example
Baccus (1986) records that the maintenance and reparation of so-called multipiece truck
wheels had caused tens of casualties and hundreds of wounded in the United States. The
Ministry of Transport had not taken any measures to prohibit this type of bus and truck
wheels because it refused to acknowledge that the maintenance procedures did not link up
at all with the way maintenance was put into practice. This means that garage mechanics
stuck to their habits because garages did not dispose of the required space and protection
devices, and because most maintenance work was done in the open air.
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